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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court failed to properly define the

charge of "theft" and whether the inadequately defined instruction
precluded the jury from considering lesser offenses, charges
pertinent to Mr. Boren's theory of the case.

"Because an appeal

challenging the refusal to give jury instructions presents questions
of law only, we grant no particular deference to the trial court's
rulings."

Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App. 1990);

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991).
2.

Whether the jury instructions created an impermissible

mandatory rebuttable presumption?

See standard of review for issue

one; accord State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992) (on
"matter[s] of statutory interpretation[,] . . . we review the trial
court's ruling for correctness and give no deference to its
conclusions"); Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470
(Utah 1989) ("A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no
particular deference").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for theft,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, presiding.

Following a two

day trial, a jury convicted Mr. Boren of the above charge on February
10, 1993.

(R 212). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Boren moved for a new

trial and a certificate of probable cause.
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(R 219-54). His motions

were denied.
On April 16, 1993, following entry of judgment for the next
lower category of offense, the trial court sentenced Mr. Boren to an
indeterminate term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison
together with an order to pay $150.00 in restitution.

(R 262-65).

The court then stayed the prison sentence and placed him on
probation for 36 months.

(R 265-66).

Other statements pertinent to the proceedings, including
motions made before, during, and after the trial, are more fully
discussed below.

The relevant motions are attached in Addendum B

and incorporated herein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts are contained in the body of the brief,
intertwined in the legal analysis regarding the jury instructions.
In brief, Lyla Shore, a friend of Jeb Clark, had borrowed
Mr. Clark's car on April 18, 1992.

(R 443, p.105).

Sometime that

day after 3:00 or 4:00 p.m., Lyla noticed the car was missing.
(R 443, p. 106). The next morning, at approximately 8:30 a.m., Jeb,
Lyla, and her son Bryan located the car at the residence of
Mr. Boren's ex-wife.

(R 443, p.106-08).

Ron Boren was owed money for repairing and fixing the car.
(R 366-67); (R 443, pp.92, 94). When Jeb, Lyla, and Bryan
confronted Ron, they told him to hand over the ignition switch, a
device used to start the car.
threw the device and ran away.

(R 443, p.113).
(R 443, p.113).
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Ron complied.

He

Bryan caught him,

punched him, and the incident ended.

(R 443, p.110).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it refused to properly define
the charge of theft.

As the courts below already had recognized,

the case ultimately hinged on the element of intent.

The "purpose

to deprive" instruction, however, was inadequately defined.

The

distinction between "temporary" deprivation and "permanent"
deprivation never was made clear to the jury.

Due to the flawed

wording of the instructions, the jury lacked the ability to
distinguish and choose between the lesser included offenses and the
temporary nature of the alleged deprivation.
The defective instructions also contained an impermissible
mandatory presumption against Mr. Boren on the critical intent
determination.

The involved jury instruction mirrored the

corresponding statute.

While such authority was an appropriate

point of legal reference for the trial court to use in deciding
whether the case should be submitted to the jury, the same authority
should not have been used by the jury in its fact finding
determinations.

The wording of the statute improperly allowed the

burden of proof to shift to Mr. Boren.

The trial court erred in not

correcting the defects in a manner consistent with Mr. Boren's
requests.

- 4
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO CORRECT THE INSTRUCTIONS
PREVENTED THE JURY FROM FINDING A "TEMPORARY" (AS
OPPOSED TO "PERMANENT") INTENT TO DEPRIVE
The case at bar presents a slight variation of the issue
presented in State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).

The issue

here is whether the trial court's failure to properly define the
charge of "theft" precluded the jury from considering lesser
offenses, charges pertinent to Mr. Boren's theory of the case.
The theft definition includes a purpose to "permanently"
deprive another of his or her property.
§ 76-6-401(3)(a).

See Utah Code Ann.

The court below, however, refused to insert the

adverb, "permanently", before the word, "deprive", in the designated
theft instructions.

(R 383-84) (copies of jury instructions #9,

#10, & 11 are attached in Addendum C).

Such an insertion was

critical to distinguishing theft from the lesser offenses.
Like Mr. Boren, the defendant in Chesnut was tried and
convicted "of theft of an operable motor vehicle in violation of
Section 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(a)(ii)."
Chesnut, 621 P.2d at 1231.

Compare (R 212), with

"Under [defendant Chesnut and

Mr. Boren#s] theory of the facts as set forth in the evidence there
was a rational basis to acquit him of the crime of theft and convict
him of the lesser included offense of joyriding[.]"

See Chesnut,

621 P.2d at 1232 (the "joyriding" statute referred to in Chesnut is
now encompassed by Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-1311(l); 41-la-1314(1));
cf. (R 225) (in Mr. Boren's case, Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311(l)
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[unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, a class A misdemeanor]
and Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314(1) [unauthorized control over a
motor vehicle, a third degree felony] had potential application).
Disputed in the Chesnut case was whether the defendant
intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property, a
motorcycle.

While the jury had apparently found such an intent, on

appeal the supreme court reversed because the defendant's theory of
temporary deprivation was omitted from the jury instructions.
Chesnut, 621 P.2d at 1231-32.

"[T]he issue of defendant's intent

should [have been] submitted to the trier of fact with the requested
instruction on the lesser included offense of joyriding."

Id.

at 1232.
Such an instruction [on lesser included offenses] may
properly be refused if the prosecution has met its
burden of proof on the greater offense, and there is
no evidence tending to reduce the greater offense. If
there be any evidence, however slight, on any
reasonable theory of the case under which defendant
might be convicted of a lesser included offense, the
trial court must, if requested, give an appropriate
instruction.
Chesnut, 621 P.2d at 1232 (original emphasis added by the court).
At trial, defendant Chesnut "testified his intention was to
return the motorcycle after he had ridden for an hour or so." Id.
at 1230. The jury, however, never received the opportunity to
consider Chesnut's theory of temporary deprivation and the lesser
included offense of joyriding.
for a new trial.

The supreme court remanded the case

Id.
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Similarly, in the case at bar the issue of intent was
inadequately considered by the jury.

The trial court's refusal to

"insert the word 'permanently' before the word deprive" was vital to
the "temporary" deprivation issue, (R 383-84), especially because of
the marginal nature of the evidence.

(R 345-46).

Jeb Clark's car was missing for no more than 18 hours.

See

(R 443, p.134); (R 443, p.106-08) (prosecution witness Lyla Shore
indicated that the car was missing sometime after 3:00 or 4:00 p.m.
on April 18, 1992, and located the next day around 8:30 a.m.); cf.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-1311(l); 41-la-1314(1) (unauthorized control
of a vehicle for less than 24 hours may be a class A misdemeanor or
a third degree felony).
When Jeb Clark (Lyla Shore, and her son, Bryan), confronted
Ron Boren, they told Ron to hand over the ignition switch, a device
used to start the car.

(R 443, p.113).

Boren immediately complied.

He threw the device over a fence and ran away.

(R 443, p.113).

Even though Mr. Boren did not politely hand over the ignition switch
to Jeb Clark, the trial court recognized that Ron had returned
control of the car back to the owner.

(R 443, p.113-14).

The temporary nature of the deprivation and the
applicability of lesser offenses already had been acknowledged by
the court during preliminary discussions over the jury instructions:
[The State]: [Mr. Boren's counsel] has [proposed a]
Class A [jury instruction], and I've done the third
degree [instruction] assuming that you [the court] are
going to give that, and . . . the way I read it is the
Defendant would have to have brought that car back

- 7

-

within 24 hours to qualify for Class A, and he didn't
do that.
[Counsel for Mr. Boren]: That's not what the law
says. . . . [W]hat the law says is it's a third
degree. If you fail to do that, it's a Class A, if
you exercise unauthorized control with intent to
temporarily deprive. That's the statutory limit.
[The State]: What I'm reading, third degree to
exercise, if the person does not return the motor
vehicle to the owner, lawful custodian, within 24
hours and he didn't do —
THE COURT: Wellf I think he did. He fMr. Boren] gave
them the key back, the ignition, when they told him to.
[The State]: Well, at any rate, that's what I'm
weighing it to.
THE COURT: Those are arguable facts for you.
the jury's. All right.
(R 443, p.133-34); (R 388).

That's

Since Ron Boren "gave them the key

back, the ignition, when they told him to[,]" (R 443, p.134), "there
was a rational basis to acquit him of the crime of theft and convict
him of the lesser included offense . . . "

Chesnut, 621 P.2d

at 1232.
The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was no
better and even then the question of intent had been the key issue:
THE COURT: Okay. I'm prepared to make a ruling and
I'll tell you that I think that this case definitely
does hinge on the intent to deprive issues. I'm going
to preface my finding with the fact that the level of
proof at a preliminary hearing, as you know, is very
low. Probable cause is a low threshold and I believe
the State has met that threshold of probable
cause. • • •
I will tell you, also, as an aside, I think the
evidence is pretty thin. I think it meets the
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threshold of probable cause but, [Counsel for
Mr. Boren], I think the points you've raised are
valid. And I'm frankly telling you I think it's a
close call, the call I've made. And I'm basing it on
what I consider to be a low threshold.
(R 345-46).
Despite the questionable nature of the State's evidence on
the "purpose to deprive" element, the trial court refused to "insert
the word 'permanently' before the word deprive."

(R 383).

The

court reasoned, "the definition of purpose to deprive is given in
instruction ten, and it uses the word permanently, etc., so I will
not change that."

(R 384). 1

However, the "purpose to deprive" definition lists three
independent meanings.

(R 194).

"Permanently" modifies only one of

the three alternative definitions.

(R 194); (R 194; 432-34) (in

response to the jury's request for clarification, the trial court
explained that "purpose to deprive" contains three independent
alternative meanings and it also penciled in "a", "b", and "c" and
underscored "or" to emphasize their separate nature).

Hence, the

1. "Purpose to deprive" is defined in Instruction #10.
The instruction, prior to the court's alterations, read:
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious
objective to withhold property permanently or for so
extended a period or to use under circumstances that a
substantial portion of its economic value, or of the
use and benefit thereof, would be lost, or to restore
the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation, or to dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner
will recover it.
(R 194) .
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jury was allowed to consider either one of the two other
alternatives, both of which were not modified by the adverb,
"permanently."2

See infra Point II (one alternative definition for

"purpose to deprive" was independently flawed).
The trial court's denial of Mr. Boren's requested
modifications was, in substance, the same type of denial by the
trial court in Chesnut.

While lesser offenses were included in the

instant action, unlike their complete omission in Chesnut, in both
cases "permanent" versus "temporary" deprivation was the critical
issue not considered by the jury.

The plain language of the

instructions here prevented the jury from considering the lesser

2. A single flawed alternative theory in a criminal trial
invalidates the entire verdict:
In a civil case, we will affirm a general verdict so
long as there is one legally valid theory among those
upon which the case went to the jury and sufficient
evidence to support a verdict on that theory.
However, in a criminal case the rule is to the
contrary. . . . [A] general verdict of guilty cannot
stand if the State's case was premised on the elements
of the crime and any one of those theories is flawed
or lacks the requisite evidentiary foundation. In
such circumstances, it is impossible to determine
whether the jury agreed unanimously on all of the
elements of a valid and evidentially supported theory
of the elements of the crime.
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added
and citations omitted); cf. State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah
1993) (per curiam) ("Since the jury was allowed to consider the
depraved indifference alternative, as well as those states of mind
described in subsections (a) and (b) . . . defendant is entitled to
a new trial"); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526 (1979) ("it
has long been settled that when a case is submitted to the jury on
alternative theories, the unconstitutionality of any of the theories
requires that the conviction [or verdict] be set aside").
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offenses in the same manner as if they had never been given.

See

(R 195-97) (lesser charges could not be considered until after the
initial determination of the theft charge); Parker v. Randolph, 442
U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) ("A critical assumption
underlying that system [of trial by jury] is that juries will follow
the instructions given them by the trial judge") quoted in Francis
v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324-35 n.9 (1985) (Brennan, J.); accord
(R 229, 230, 232) (juror affidavit explaining that the jury
obediently followed the instructions: "I and others felt that
because of the instructions, a lesser charge could not be considered
unless the accused was 'not guilty of the greater offense")
(attached in Addendum D).
In fact, in Chesnut, in addition to having arguably enough
evidence to support the second degree felony theft charge, see 621
P.2d at 1231, the jury also considered only the permanent
deprivation alternative.

Id. at 1231 n.l.

Thus, unlike the present

situation where the applicability of "permanent" deprivation never
was made clear, (R 194), the Chesnut jury specifically focused on
whether the defendant had a purpose to permanently deprive.
P.2d at 1231 n.l.

621

Despite the jury's finding of the requisite

intent, the supreme court held that the trial court should not have
rejected defendant Chesnut's theory of temporary deprivation.

Id.

at 1232.
The Chesnut principles apply to Mr. Boren's situation with
even greater force because of the unclear instructions and the
availability of three independent alternative "purpose to deprive"
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definitions.

(R 194; 432-34).3

Since the adverb, "permanently",

was not inserted before the word deprive, the jury was allowed to
find a permanent deprivation or a temporary deprivation.

In other

words, theft could have been established under either type of intent
and the jury was left with no reason to consider the lesser
charges.4

The trial court's ruling was in error.
POINT II

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
MANDATORY PRESUMPTION
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
7

protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.7"

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313

(1985) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).

"This

'bedrock, "axiomatic and elementary" [constitutional] principle7

3. Cf. State v. Ash, 23 Utah 2d 14, 456 P.2d 154 (1969)
(unlike the failure in the case at bar to specifically instruct the
jury on permanent deprivation, "defendant [Ash] could not have been
prejudiced by a failure to have the jury consider whether his intent
was to deprive the owner of the use of his car temporarily because
the court clearly told the jury to find the defendant not guilty if
they failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to
deprive the owner permanently of the use of the car") (emphasis
added by the court).
4. The lower court's denial of Mr. Boren7s requests
created an "all or nothing" theft instruction in a manner already
condemned in the analogous context of a court refusing to give a
lesser included offense. See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428
(Utah 1986) ("This is exactly the sort of forced choice that lesser
included offense instructions are designed to avoid, and exactly the
choice that the jury would not have had to make if [the lesser
included offense] instruction had been give").
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prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury
charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of
persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a
crime."

Franklin, 471 U.S. at 313 (citations omitted).
The issue here is whether the jury instructions relieved

the State of its burden of proof on the critical element of intent.
Jury instruction #10 contains the contested language.

It stated in

pertinent part:
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious
objective to withhold property permanently or for so
extended a period or to use under circumstances that a
substantial portion of its economic value, or of the
use and benefit thereof, would be lost, or to restore
the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation, or to dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner
will recover it.
(R 194) (emphasis added).
"The analysis is straightforward.

'The threshold inquiry

in ascertaining the constitutional analysis applicable to this kind
of jury instruction is to determine the nature of the presumption it
describes.,H

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1985)

(quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979)).
A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it
must infer the presumed fact if the State proves
certain predicate facts. A mandatory presumption may
be either conclusive or rebuttable. A conclusive
presumption removes the presumed element from the case
once the State have proven the predicate facts giving
rise to the presumption. A rebuttable presumption
does not remove the presumed element from the case but
nevertheless requires the jury to find the presumed
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element unless the defendant persuades the jury that
such a finding is unwarranted.
Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314 & n.2.5
Jury instruction #10 created a mandatory presumption.
Instead of requiring the State to prove a "purpose to deprive", the
instruction only required the State to prove a predicate fact.
While a jury may infer a "purpose to deprive" upon proof that "the
property [would be restored] only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation . . . ," a jury also should be able to reject such an
inference.

Instruction #10, however, precluded such a rejection

because it simply equated a "purpose to deprive" with the
corresponding predicate fact.

The predicate fact was essentially

prima facie evidence of the "purpose to deprive" element.

Once the

State established the predicate fact, the burden shifted to
Mr. Boren to show that he did not possess the criminal intent.
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987), lends analogous
guidance in this regard.

The opinion carefully distinguished

between an unconstitutional presumption and a permissible inference.
The following language contains an improper presumption: "Possession

5. Two sentences in Franklin focused on the element of
intent. "The acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are
presumed to be the product of the person's will, but the presumption
may be rebutted. A person of sound mind and discretion is presumed
to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts but the
presumption may be rebutted." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307,
315 (1985). Notwithstanding the Georgia Supreme Court's
interpretation of "this language as creating no more than a
permissive inference. . . ," the United States Supreme Court
reversed because of "what a reasonable juror could have understood
the charge as meaning." Id. at 315-16.
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of property recently stolen when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the
person in possession stole the property."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1)).

See id. at 456 (citing

A slight modification, however,

corrects the presumption: "Under the law of the State of Utah,
possession of property recently stolen, when a person in possession
fails to make a satisfactory explanation of such possession, is a
fact from which you may infer that the person in possession stole
such property."

745 P.2d at 456.

Unlike the modified Johnson instruction which enabled the
jury to infer, instruction #10 left the jury with no choice other
than to presume a "purpose to deprive" upon proof of the predicate
fact.

Using the predicate fact to infer criminal intent is proper;

however, the jury should not have been instructed that the predicate
fact "means" intent.

(R 194).

The lower court failed to

distinguish between authority which may be considered by the court
and instructions which must not be given to the jury.

Compare State

v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 326-27 (Utah 1985) ("the statute provides
a standard [for the court] by which to determine the sufficiency of
the evidence for submitting the case to the jury"), with id. at 327
(for situations like the case at bar, "the statutory language should
not be used in any form in instructing juries in criminal cases").
Jury Instructions #9 & #11 also contained and incorporated
the unconstitutional intent definition.

(R 193, 195). The jury

instructions were impermissibly defective.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

&

day of October, 1993.

3

OtJAL S. FUJINO
RONALD
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

ft

day of October, 1993.

£•
RONALD S. VFUT/INO

- 16 -

DELIVERED by
this

day of October, 1993.
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ADDENDUM A

41-1-109. Unlawful control over vehicles — Penalties —
Effect of prior consent — Accessory or accomplice.
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized control over a vehicle, not his
own, without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to
temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of possession of the vehicle,
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) An offense under this section is a third degree felony if the actor does
not return the vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after
the exercise of unauthorized control.
(3) 'Die consent of the owner or legal custodian of a vehicle to its control by
the actor is not in any case presumed or implied because of the owner's or
legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the control of the vehicle by
the same or a different person.
(4) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice
in, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

41-la-1311. Unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers,,
or semitrailers — Penalties — Effect of prior consent — Accessory or accomplice.
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control
over a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the consent of
the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the
owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different person.
(3) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice
in, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

41-la-1314. Third degree felony to exercise unauthorized
control for extended time.
(1) It is a third degree felony to exercise unauthorized control over a motoi
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer if the person does not return the motor vehicle
trailer, or semitrailer to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after
the exercise of unauthorized control.
. (2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, oi
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different person.

THEFT
76-6-401.

Definitions.

For the purposes of this part
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and
birds, written instruments or other writings representmg or embodying
rights concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise
containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility
nature such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or mvention which
the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, m relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest m property,
whether to the obtainer or another, in relation to labor or services, to
secure performance thereof; and m relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if be obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

76-6-412- Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen propertv»
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be punTa) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000,
U) pro^rty stolen is a firearm or an operable ,motor vehicle;
(Ui) aetoVis armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft
°F(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;

ADDENDUM B

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

Jp-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
:

v*

:

RONALD L. BOREN,

:

Defendant.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Case No. 921901604FS
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

:

The defendant, RONALD L. BOREN, respectfully moves this
Court to grant him a new trial in the above-numbered case pursuant
to the provisions of Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(1992) .
This Motion is made on the grounds that the jury was
substantially misled by the jury instructions.

See attached

Questionnaire response of juror Garth N. Peterson.

The jury

instructions misled the jury by defining the offense of Automobile
Theft, a second-degree felony under §§76-6-401, 76-6-404 and
76-6-412, Utah Code Ann. (1990), in a manner that is
indistinguishable from the lesser offense of Unauthorized Control
Over a Motor Vehicle, a third-degree felony under §41-la-1314, Utah
Code Ann. (Supp. 1992), and a class A misdemeanor under §41-la-1311,

00225

Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992) (see attached jury instructions 9, 10,
11, 12, 13 and 14).
Further, instructing the jury on the provisions of
§76-6-401(3)(b), Utah Code Ann. (1990) (definition of "purpose to
deprive), created a mandatory presumption of criminal intent on the
basis of mere conduct.

Defendant objected to so instructing the

jury prior to trial on the same grounds.

See attached Motion in

Limine Not to Instruct the Jury on §76-6-401(3)(b).

DATED this

•J6cy^
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Attorney at Law

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this /<7

day of -&fH?ii, 1993,

C'-*X<*
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ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
V.

Case No. 921901604FS
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

RONALD L. BOREN,
Defendant.

Based on Motion of defendant and for good cause shown, it
is hereby ordered that the conviction previously entered in the
above-numbered case be vacated and that a new trial be held in the
above-numbered case.
IT IS SO ORDERED this

day of April, 1993.

HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Third District Court

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this

/'

day of April, 1993

,,<r. '--°*fs
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/'7
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Prosecutorial misconduct.
Prosecutorial misconduct before trial was
grounds for a new trial, not an arrest of judgment, even though defendant's motion for arrest of judgment or in the alternative for a new
trial was made before imposition of sentence.
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct App.
1988).
Variance between charge and verdict.
Although the verdict form signed by the jury
foreman stated that the defendant was guilty
of "forcible sexual assault" and the information

Rule 2 4

had charged the defendant with "aggravated
sexual assault," the variance did not justify the
granting of a motion to arrest judgment on the
basis of uncertainty as to what the jury intended; an error on the jury verdict form does
not create uncertainty per se, and there was no
reason to doubt that the jury intended to find
the defendant guilty as charged. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987).
Cited in State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29
(Utah 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. JUT. 2d Criminal
Law §§ 520 to 524.
C.J.S. — 23A CJ.S. Criminal Law § 1453 et
seq.

AXJL — Coram nobis on ground of other's
confession to crime, 46 A.L.R.4th 468.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «» 974 to
976.

Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The
motion shall be accompanied by afiBdavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure afiBdavits or
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned
either in evidence or in argument.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Absence of witness.
Affidavits of jurors.
Bias or prejudice of jurors.
Discretion of court.
Evidence m support of motion.
Misconduct of jury.
Motion to reopen preliminary hearing.
—Dismissal of charges.
Newly discovered evidence.
Prosecutorial misconduct.
Verdict supported by evidence.
Cited.
Absence of witness.
Where the evidence was discovered before
trial but the witness was absent, not only must
diligence have been shown in attempting to ob-

tain the testimony of such witness, but an application must have been made to obtain a
postponement of the trial so as to give opportunity to obtain such witness or evidence before
defendant might avail himself of a motion for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P.2d
167 (1931).
Defendant was not entitled to a new trial to
produce a witness who was unavailable at trial
where witness' absence was not due to any
error or impropriety at trial, but was due to
attendance at an out-of-town convention, and
defendant did not ask for a new trial date or a
continuance to accommodate the witness" calendar. State v. Gehnng, 694 P.2d 599 (Utah
1984).
Affidavits of jurors.
Verdict of guilty of larceny of sheep which
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INSTRUCTION NO.

<={

Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of
theft if that person obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive the owner
thereof.

00233

INSTRUCTION NO. , ffo

"Property"

means

anything

of

value,

including

tangible

personal property.
"Obtain* means, in relation to property, to bring about a
transfer

of possession or of some other legally recognized

interest in property, whether to the obtained or another.
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious objective
to withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or
to use under circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be
lost, or to restore the property only upon payment of a reward
or other compensation,

or to dispose of the property under

circumstances that maJce it unlikely that the owner will recover
it.
An "operable motor vehicle" is a motor vehicle capable of
being driven.
"On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or
is near the day alleged in the Information.

0023^

INSTRUCTION

NO.

\\

Before you can convict the defendant, Ronald L. Boren, of
the crime of Theft as charged in count I of the information, you
must believe from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt

each and every

one of the following

elements of that

offense:
1.

That on or about the 18th day of April, 1992, in Salt

Lake County,

State of Utah, the defendant, Ronald L. Boren,

obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of
another;
2.

That the defendant did so with the purpose to deprive

the owner thereof; and
3.

That the property^as an operable motor vehicle.

If after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty of the offense of Theft as charged in
count I of the information.

If, on the other hand, you are not

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must consider the guilt or innocence
of the defendant with respect to the offense of Unlawful Taking
Of A Vehicle, a lesser included offense of count I.

00233

INSTRUCTION NO. l£t
The law permits a jury to find an accused guilty of amy
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the crime charged
in the information whenever such a course in consistent with the
facts found by the jury from the evidence in the case and with
the law as stated by the Court.
If the jury should find the accused "not guilty" of the
greater offense as charged in the information and defined in
these instructions, then the jury should proceed to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused as to any lesser offense which
is necessarily included in the offense charged.

0 0? 36

INSTRUCTION NO-

\h

Before you can convict the defendant, Ronald L. Boren, of
the offense of Unlawful Taking Of A Vehicle, a Third Degree
Felony, a lesser included offense in count I of the information,
you must have found that the evidence fails to establish one or
more of the elements of Theft beyond a reasonable doubt, and you
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and
every one of the following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 18th day of April, 1992, in Salt

Lake County,

State of Utah, the defendant, Ronald L. Boren,

intentionally or knowingly exercised control over a vehicle;
2.

That the defendant

exercised

such

control with the

purpose to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful, custodian of
the possession so such vehicle;
3-

That the vehicle was not the defendant's own;

4.

That the owner or lawful custodian did not consent to

nor authorize the defendant to exercise such control over the
vehicle; and
5.

That the defendant did not return the vehicle to the

owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of
such unauthorized control.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of the offense of Unlawful Taking
Of A Vehicle,
information.

a

lesser

included

offense

in count I of the

If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond

oo

a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements,
then you must find the defendant not guilty of count I.

00233

INSTRUCTION NO.

A

The offense of Unlawful Control over a Motor Vehicle
is a lesser included offense within the charged offense of
Theft of a Motor Vehicle*
Before you may convict the defendant of the crime of
Unlawful Control Over A Motor Vehicle the prosecution must
prove each and every one of the following elements to your
satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That on April 18, 1992;

2.

In Salt Lake County;

3.

Ronald L. Boren;

4.

Exercised unauthorized control over a motor

vehicle of Jeb Clark;
5.

Without the consent of Jeb Clark;

6.

With intent to temporarily deprive the owner of it.

If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of
these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
Ronald L. Boren not guilty.

0023?

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt LaJce City, Utah
84111
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION IN LIMINE NOT TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
§76-6-401(3)(b)

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 921901604FS
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

RONALD L- BOREN,
Defendant.

MOTION
The defendant, RONALD L. BOREN, respectfully moves this
Court not to instruct the jury according to the provisions of
§76-6-401(3) (b), Utah Code Ann. (1990).

This Motion is made on the

grounds that so instructing the jury violates constitutional rights
of due process by creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption of
criminal intent that shifts the burden of persuasion to the
defendant to prove his innocence.

See U.S. Const, amends. V, XIV;

Utah Const, art. I, §7; §76-1-501, Utah Code Ann (1990); Francis v.
Franklin, 86 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); State v. Turner. 736 P.2d 1043
(Utah App. 1987) .

00240

FACTS
Plaintiff State alleges that on April 18, 1992, the
defendant took an operable motor vehicle belonging to his friend,
Jeb Clark, then told Clark that he would return the car only when
Clark paid him $20 for his work replacing the car's brakeshoes.
Clark located the car several hours later in the possession of
defendant.

The defendant ran away, was caught and beaten by Mr.

Clark's friend, and Mr. Clark repossessed the car.
ARGUMENT
On September 11, 1992, defendant was charged with Theft
under §76-6-404, Utah Code Ann. (1990):
76-6-404.

Theft - Elements

A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the property
of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Theft of an operable motor vehicle is classified as a
second-degree felony under §76-6-412 (1) (a) (ii) , Utah Code Ann.
(1990) :
76-6-412. Theft - Classification of offenses Action for treble damages against receiver of
stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as
provided in this chapter shall be punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if
the:

(ii) property stolen is a firearm or
an operable motor vehicle;

-2 -
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Section 76-6-404 requires that the actor have a "purpose to
deprive" the owner of the motor vehicle.

"Purpose to deprive" is

defined as follows under §76-6-401(3), Utah Code Ann. (1990):
76-6-401.

Definitions.

For the purposes of this part:

(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the
conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for
so extended a period or to use under such
circumstances that a substantial portion of
its economic value, or of the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment
of a reward or other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.

This Court should not instruct the jury on the provisions
of §76-6-401(3) (b) because the statutory language would create a
mandatory rebuttable presumption on the facts of this case that the
defendant possessed the requisite mens rea for the offense of Theft
as charged.

A mandatory rebuttable presumption of guilt violates

constitutional due process in the criminal context because it shifts

-3 -
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the burden to the defendant to prove his innocence.

U.S. Const,

amends. V, XIV; Utah Const, art. I, I7. 1
This may be an issue of first impression, but Utah courts
have applied the same reasoning to prohibit instructing juries on
other statutes.

In State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987)

the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction for Burglary
and Theft because the trial court instructed the jury verbatim
according to the provisions of §76-6-402(1), Utah Code Ann. (1978):
76-6-402.

Presumptions and defenses.

The following presumption shall be applicable to
this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen,
when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence that the person in possession
stole the property.

1

Section 76-1-501, Utah Code Ann, (1990), codifies these
constitutional principles:
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence - "Element of
the offense" defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of the
offense charged against him is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the
defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of
the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or
forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are
not elements of the offense but shall be
established by a preponderance of the evidence.
-4 -
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The court wrote:
In this case the trial court instructed the
jury that possession of recently stolen property,
in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, is
"prima facia" evidence of theft by the person in
possession of the property. Such an instruction,
nevertheless, fits within the Franklin definition
of a mandatory rebuttable presumption: "A
[mandatory] rebuttable presumption ... requires
the jury to find the element unless the defendant
persuades the jury that such a finding in
unwarranted.

We hold that Chambers and Pacheco are
dispositive of whether Instructions 17, 18, and
19 herein are constitutional. Those instructions
violate due process because they relate to the
issue of guilt and relieve the State of its
burden of proof. We reiterate the admonition in
Chambers that the language of Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-402(1) (1978), parroted in Instructions 17
and 18, should not be used in any form to
instruct juries in theft and burglary cases.
State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d at 327.
Id. at 1045 (quoting State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah
1985), quoting Francis v. Franklin, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)); but see
State v. Johnson, 745 P. 2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987) (alteration of
statutory language may cure constitutional defect) .
CONCLUSION
For these reasons this Court should not instruct the jury
according to the provisions of §76-6-401(3) (b) because such an
instruction shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove his
innocence contrary to constitutional due process of law.
DATED this

V^

day of February, 1993

^^Ja9^
ROGER K T ^ S C O W C R O F T /
Attorney for Defendant
-5 -
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MAJELED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt LaJce
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt LaJce City, Utah
84111 this

Y

day of February, 1993.
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ADDENDDM C

INSTRUCTION NO,

<3

Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of
theft: if that person obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive the owner

thereof.

0023,?

INSTRUCTION NO.

"Property"

means

anything

ltD

of value,

including

tangible

personal property.
"Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a
transfer

of possession or of some other legally recognized

interest in property, whether to the obtained or another.
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious objective
to withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or
to use under circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof , would be
lost:, or to restore the property only upon payment of a reward
or other compensation, or to dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unliJcely that the owner will recover
it.
An "operable motor vehicle" is a motor vehicle capable of
being driven.
"On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or
is near the day alleged in the Information.

0023^

INSTRUCTION

NO.

\\

Before you can convict the defendant, Ronald L. Boren, of
the crime of Theft as charged in count I of the information, you
must believe from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt

each and every

one of the following elements of that

offense:
1.

That on or about -the 18th day of April, 1992f in Salt

Lake County,

State of Utahr

the defendant, Ronald L. Boren,

obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of
another;
2.

That the defendant did so with the purpose to deprive

the owner thereof; and
3.

That the property's an operable motor vehicle*

If after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty of the offense of Theft as charged in
count I of the information.

If, on the other hand, you are not

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must consider the guilt or innocence
of the defendant with respect to the offense of Unlawful Taking
Of A Vehicle, a lesser included offense of count I.
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ADDENDUM D

Roger K. Scowcroft
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 Southf Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
QUESTIONNAIRE
1.

Do you believe that Jeb Clark owned the Datsun
automobile that Mr. Boren worked on and later took?
Yes _x
No
No Opinion
Explain:
Jeb Clark had possession of the automobile. Whether
his possession was entirely legal seemed irrelevant
to the trial. Mr. Clark was not on trial, Mr. Boren
was. And it seemed clear that the defendant took
possession of something that wasn't his.

Do you believe that the defendant, Mr. Boren, intended
to permanently deprive Jeb Clark of his automobile?
Yes
No

x

No Opinion
Explain:
I believe Mr. Boren took the property with intent
to get payment for fixing the brakes.
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Do you believe that the defendant, Mr. Boren, intended
to temporarily deprive Jeb Clark of his automobile?
Yes

x

No
No Opinion
Explain:
Same as response to #2

During your jury deliberations on February 10, 1993,
the jury requested that the Court make available
portions of the record. Why?
Explain:
One jury member seemed confused about what had
been stated in court as opposed to what other
members were saying.
As I recall, the dispute centered around the
li^cense plate issue.

002.

A copy of the jury instructions is attached to the
back of this Questionnaire.. During your jury
deliberations on February 10, 1993, the jury requested
that the Court explain Instruction No. 10. Did
Instruction No. 10 confuse you or other members of the
jury? Why?
Yes

x

No
No Opinion
Explain:
One jury member was confused. All agreed that the
defendant had "obtained" unauthorized control of the
property. All agreed that the defendant took the
property for "payment", and all agreed that it was
an "operable motor vehicle."
One member felt that the "or's" in "purpose to
deprive" should be read as "and's", meaning that
all conditions in that paragraph should be met.

Having heard the testimony at trial, do you believe
that the defendant, Mr. Boren, had ever been convicted
of other crimes? Did your belief in that regard
influence your decision to convict Mr. Boren for Auto
Theft as charged at trial?
Yes
No

x

No Opinion
Explain:
Yes, there was testimony about Mr. Boren's previous
record. It received little or no attention from the
jury, however, and the testimony did not influence
my decision.

00

Other comments or observations:
While all felt the defendant was guilty, some
wanted a lesser charge• I felt that the state
was making a big deal out of a fairly insignificant
matter.
However, I and others felt that because of the
instructions, a lesser charge could not be considered unless the accused, was "not guilty of
the greater offense," (Instructions #12 & #13)

DATED this

*Z&

day of Febi

1993-
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